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Abstract
In three experiments we investigated whether conscious object recognition is necessary or sufficient for effects of object
memories on figure assignment. In experiment 1, we examined a brain-damaged participant, AD, whose conscious object
recognition is severely impaired. AD’s responses about figure assignment do reveal effects from memories of object structure,
indicating that conscious object recognition is not necessary for these effects, and identifying the figure-ground test employed here
as a new implicit test of access to memories of object structure. In experiments 2 and 3, we tested a second brain-damaged
participant, WG, for whom conscious object recognition was relatively spared. Nevertheless, effects from memories of object
structure on figure assignment were not evident in WG’s responses about figure assignment in experiment 2, indicating that
conscious object recognition is not sufficient for effects of object memories on figure assignment. WG’s performance sheds light
on AD’s performance, and has implications for the theoretical understanding of object memory effects on figure assignment.
© 2000 Elsevier Science Ltd. All rights reserved.
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1. Introduction
For each edge, or contour, in the visual field, two
regions can be defined, one lying along each side of the
contour. The Gestalt psychologists showed that
configural properties such as symmetry, convexity,
smallness of relative area, and enclosure are among the
factors that determine which one of those two regions
will appear to be shaped by the contour, and which will
appear to be shapeless. The shaped region is called the
‘figure’, and the shapeless region is often called the
‘ground’ because, at least for two-dimensional (2-D)
displays, shapeless regions appear to continue behind
shaped regions and hence, to be backgrounds to the
figures. The Rubin vase:faces display shown in Fig. 1
demonstrates that conscious object recognition occurs
for figures but not for grounds.
Many investigators consider the Gestalt configural
cues to be low-level, or bottom-up, cues, in that they
can be appraised without access to object memories.
Recent research shows that some high level cues, entail-
ing access to memories of the structure of known
objects, can also affect initial figure assignment (Peter-
son, 1994a,b; Peterson & Gibson, 1994a,b; Peterson,
Harvey & Weidenbacher, 1991; Vecera & Farah, 1997;
Peterson, Gerhardstein, Mennemeier & Rapcsak, 1998).
In the stimulus displays used by Peterson et al. two
adjacent regions shared a contour; one region was a
good depiction of a known object when it was seen as
figure (called a ‘high-denotative’ region), whereas the
other was not (called a ‘low-denotative’ region) (see
Fig. 2). Displays were shown both upright (i.e. in the
orientation in which the object in the high-denotative
region was in its typical upright orientation, shown in
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Fig. 2a–d), and inverted (i.e. misoriented from upright
by a 180° rotation around the z-axis). Fig. 2e,f are
inverted versions of Fig. 2c,d, respectively. Changing
the orientation of these stimuli from upright to inverted
does not change any of the low-level cues known to be
present in the displays. Changing the orientation does
change the quickness with which object recognition can
be accomplished, however: access to memories of object
structure is delayed for inverted objects compared to
upright objects (Jolicœur, 1988; Tarr & Pinker, 1989;
Ashbridge & Perrett, 1998). Therefore, orientation-de-
pendent changes in the likelihood of seeing high-deno-
tative regions as figures can be taken to reflect
contributions to figure assignment from memories of
object structure (Peterson et al., 1991; Peterson, 1994a).
Indeed, across a number of different experiments,
Peterson and her colleagues found that high-denotative
regions were more likely to be seen as figures when the
stimuli were upright rather than inverted. Therefore,
they took their findings to imply that figure assignment
is affected by object memories accessed early in the
course of perceptual processing. By indicating that the
top:bottom spatial relationships of the parts mattered,
the upright-inverted difference implied that the relevant
object memories represented object structure. The ori-
entation dependency of these effects also implied that
memories of object structure must be activated quickly
in order to influence figure assignment. The delay in
access to memories of object structure for inverted
displays seems to be sufficient to diminish or eliminate
effects of object memories on figure assignment but not
to eliminate conscious object recognition of inverted
familiar objects once they are seen as figures (Peterson
et al., 1991).
On the basis of these and other experiments Peterson
et al. (1991), Peterson (1994a,b, 1999a), Peterson and
Gibson (1994a,b)) proposed that, in parallel with as-
sessments of the configural cues, memories of object
Fig. 2. Sample displays used in experiments investigating the role of
object memories in figure-ground assignment. In (a), two equal-area
regions share a central contour. The black region on the right is high
in denotivity in that it portrays a portion of a table lamp when it is
seen as figure. In (b), black and white regions equated for area and
convexity share a central contour. The white region is symmetric
around a vertical axis drawn through its center, but low in denotivity;
whereas the black region is asymmetric and high in denotivity (it
portrays a portion of a sea horse). In (c) and (d) configural cues favor
the interpretation that the low-denotative black regions are the
figures. They are smaller in area than the white region; in (c) the
black region is symmetric and enclosed by the white region; in (d) the
black region is partially symmetric and overlaps the white region (a
monocular depth cue). The white regions are high in denotivity,
portraying standing women in (c) and profile faces in (d). Figures (e)
and (f) are inverted versions of (c) and (d). Regions that are smaller
in area, enclosed, symmetric, and:or overlapping other regions when
upright retain those characteristics when inverted.
Fig. 1. The Rubin vase:faces stimulus. When the center black region
is seen as the figure, it appears to have a definite shape, and the object
it portrays, a vase, can be recognized; the adjacent, white region,
appears locally shapeless. When the white region appears to be the
figure, it appears to have a definite shape, and the objects it portrays
can be recognized; the adjacent, black region appears to be shapeless.
This coupling between figural status and conscious recognition led
many investigators to assume that access to object memories occurred
for figures only and not for grounds.
structure are accessed on both sides of contours de-
tected early in processing. On this account, object mem-
ories are accessed for regions ultimately determined to
be grounds as well as for regions ultimately determined
to be figures, just as the configural cues are assessed for
regions on both sides of a shared contour.
The proposal that object memories are accessed suffi-
ciently early in visual processing to affect the first figure
assignment challenges a basic assumption held by many
investigators of vision (e.g. Ko¨hler, 1929; Neisser, 1967;
Hochberg, 1971; Marr, 1982; Biederman, 1987; War-
rington & James, 1989) who assume that object memo-
ries are accessed only by figures and not by grounds.
Driver and Baylis (1995) offered an alternative account
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of our results that preserves the traditional assumption.
They argued that observers may begin by reporting the
first-perceived figure assignment as per instructions in
our experiments, but their task set may change into one
of looking for familiar objects after they recognize that
some of the figures portray familiar objects. Once par-
ticipants adopt this new strategy, they might reverse the
initial figure assignment in their search for familiar
objects. In that case, their reports might indicate which
region portrays a familiar object rather than which
region was first assigned figural status. On this alterna-
tive account, access to object memories follows figure
assignment.
The ability to consciously recognize the objects por-
trayed by figures seems to be a necessary component of
the alternative account articulated by Driver and Baylis
(1995). In contrast, the ability to consciously recognize
the objects portrayed by figures is not necessary to the
account proposed by Peterson and her colleagues. In
their view, although quick access to memories of object
structure affects figure assignment, mere access to ob-
ject memories in the course of perceptual organization
is not sufficient for conscious object recognition; figural
status is required as well (as the Rubin stimulus in Fig.
1 makes clear)1, as is access to other types of knowledge
(e.g. semantic and functional knowledge; Peterson,
1999a,b). Thus, in the view of Peterson and her col-
leagues, it should be possible to find object memory
effects on figure assignment even when conscious object
recognition is impaired.
In the two experiments reported in this paper, we
investigated whether conscious object recognition is
necessary or sufficient for effects of object memories on
figure assignment. In experiment 1, we examined a
brain-damaged participant, AD, whose conscious ob-
ject recognition is severely impaired (i.e. she is a visual
agnosic). We found that AD’s responses about figure
assignment do reveal effects from memories of object
structure, indicating that conscious object recognition is
not necessary for these effects. In experiments 2 and 3,
we tested a second brain-damaged participant, WG, for
whom conscious object recognition was relatively
spared. Nevertheless, effects from memories of object
structure on figure assignment were not evident in
WG’s responses about figure assignment in experiment
2, indicating that conscious object recognition is not
sufficient for effects of object memories on figure as-
signment. WG’s performance sheds light on AD’s per-
formance, and has implications for the theoretical
understanding of object memory effects on figure
assignment.
2. Experiment 1
In experiment 1, we tested the visual agnosic partici-
pant AD four times. AD was given the test of object
memory effects on figure assignment (the OMEFA test)
three times, twice upright (experiments 1A and 1B) and
once inverted (experiment 1C). If conscious object
recognition is necessary for object memory effects on
figure assignment, then AD’s figure reports in the
OMEFA test should not reflect object memory effects,
for either upright or inverted displays. If, on the other
hand, conscious object recognition is not necessary for
object memory effects on figure assignment, then AD’s
figure reports could reveal effects of object memories
for upright displays (experiments 1A and 1B) but would
not be expected to reveal such effects for inverted
displays (experiment 1C). The OMEFA test may consti-
tute an implicit test of access to memories of object
structure in a visual agnosic participant like AD, for
whom conscious object recognition is severely impaired.
In experiment 1D, we evaluated AD’s performance on
another implicit test of access to memories of object
structure — Riddoch and Humphreys (1993) real:un-
real objects test — in order to investigate whether the
two tests are equally sensitive indices of access to
memories of object structure.
Normal (i.e. non-brain-damaged) control participants
were also tested on the OMEFA test and a test of the
Gestalt configural cues.
2.1. Participants
AD participated in experiments 1A–D; her case his-
tory is presented below. In addition 11 female control
participants (mean age71.1 years, range 62–82) were
given the OMEFA test and a test of Gestalt configural
cue contributions to figure assignment in experiment
1A. The control participants were healthy volunteers
tested at the University of Arizona after they partici-
pated in a memory study.
2.2. Case history
At the time of testing, AD was a 74 year old visual
agnosic female, with bilateral temporo-occipital lesions
(Fig. 3a). Her first stroke, in May 1995, resulted in
damage to structures surrounding the left temporo-oc-
cipital sulcus, involving the middle occipital gyrus and
inferior temporal gyrus (Brodman Areas 18, 19 and 37).
In December 1995 she had a second stroke, resulting in
right-hemisphere damage centered on the middle occip-
ital gyrus, just posterior to the temporal occipital sul-
cus, involving area 17 and the white matter underlying
area 18. For further details see Bartolomeo, Bachoud-
Le´vi, de Gelder, Denes, Barba, Brugieres and Degos,
1998 and de Gelder, Bachoud-Le´vi and Degos (1998).
1 Note that high-denotative regions are not necessarily seen as
figures, especially when other cues compete with the effects of object
memories (Peterson & Gibson, 1993, 1994a,b; Peterson, 1999a,b).
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Fig. 3. (a) AD’s lesion locations mapped onto Damasio and Damasio templates. (b). A map of WG’s lesion locations. See text for further
explication.
Our tests of AD commenced at the end of December
1996.
AD’s conscious object recognition abilities were
severely impaired (see Table 1 for a summary of AD’s
preserved and impaired capabilities. For further details,
see Bartolomeo et al., 1998 and de Gelder et al., 1998).
AD identified only 13:33 real objects and only 133:247
line drawings, and provided no additional information
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via gestures when she failed to identify an object, or did
so incorrectly. Moreover, AD failed on tasks requiring
her to categorize pictures based on their meaning or
function (see Table 1). These behaviors indicate that
AD had impaired access to semantic and functional
knowledge from visual input. Even though AD was
unable to reliably activate those representations neces-
sary for conscious object recognition from visual input,
she performed visual mental imagery tasks almost per-
fectly, and she could produce a reasonable copy of a
composite drawing. These latter behaviors indicate that
AD’s object knowledge was preserved, even though
access from visual input was severely impaired.
2.3. Method
2.3.1. Stimuli
Three tests were used in experiment 1. One test was
designed to assess the participant’s use of the Gestalt
configural cues to determine figure assignment. A sec-
ond test was designed to assess effects of object memo-
ries on figure assignment. A third test was the
real:unreal objects test from Riddoch and Humphreys
(1993) Birmingham Object Recognition Battery
(BORB), designed as an implicit test of access to object
memories. Each of these tests is described below.
2.3.2. Gestalt configural cues test
In experiment 1A, we assessed participant’s ability to
use configural cues to determine figure assignment. Our
test was a set of 11 stimuli depicting novel black and
white (B&W) regions alternating with each other (sam-
ples are shown in Fig. 4). The number of alternating
B&W regions in each stimulus ranged from 5 to 9. The
alternating B&W regions were contained within a hori-
zontally elongated rectangular frame, and were taller
than they were wide; hence, they had a vertical axis of
elongation. This set included stimuli testing the follow-
ing configural cues and their combination: convexity*
(N2), symmetry*2 (N2), convexity* versus symme-
try (N4), symmetry versus symmetry-plus-convexity*
(N2), and convexity versus symmetry-plus-convex-
ity* (N1). An asterisk marks the cue that is expected
to determine figural status in each type of stimulus.
Half of the regions that possessed the marked attributes
were black and half were white. There were two ver-
sions of each of these stimuli; the assignment of black
and white lightness to the regions in the display re-
versed in these two versions. Observers saw both ver-
sions of each stimulus, but they did not see the second
version of any stimulus until they had seen the first
version of each stimulus in the set. If responses were
based on lightness alone rather than the starred
configural cue, then the cued region should be reported
to be figure only 50% of the time. Hence, the effective-
ness of the configural cues was assessed against a
baseline of 50%.
Table 1
AD’s preserved and impaired abilities
Preser6ed
Position discrimination (18:20)
Dot counting (9:10)
Dot location (9:10)
Line orientation score25; normal
Mental imagery
Object form (24:24)
Animal size (18:19)
Drawing from name (40:40 good depictions)
Tactile naming (35:35)
Copying pictures (80:80 good copies)
Verbal IQ (WAISR109)
Impaired
Famous faces (1:40)
Farnsworth D-15 color perception (17:32)
Functional pair categorization (1:10)
Semantic pair categorization (0:10)
VOSPa
Silhouette naming (0:20)
Incomplete letters (14:20)
Object decision (5:20)
Object recognition
Real objects (13:33)
Line drawings (133:247)
a VOSP, visual object and space perception battery.
Fig. 4. Sample stimuli used in the Gestalt configural cues test. In (a)
the white regions are symmetric, whereas the adjacent black regions
are asymmetric. This stimulus is one of the stimuli used to test the
effectiveness of symmetry as a figure cue. In (b) both black and white
regions are symmetric; the black regions are also convex. This stimu-
lus is one of the stimuli used to test the effectiveness of convexity plus
as a figure cue.
2 The term ‘symmetry’ refers to whether there was reflectional
symmetry around the vertical axis of the individual regions of one or
the other lightness.
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Fig. 5. The stimuli used by Peterson et al. (1998) and in the present
experiments. The stimuli in the top row are experimental stimuli, in
which one region is high in denotivity, whereas the adjacent region is
low in denotivity. In (a), the high-denotative region portrays a
standing woman in black on the left. In (b) the high-denotative region
portrays a sea horse in white on the right. The stimuli in the bottom
row are control stimuli in which one region is a scrambled version of
a high-denotative region in an experimental stimulus. The scrambled
regions in the control stimuli in the bottom row were created from
the high-denotative regions of the experimental stimuli in the top
row. The scrambled region created from the standing woman in (a) is
black and lies on the left in the control stimulus (c) in the bottom row
so that the correspondence between the high denotative region and
the scrambled region can be seen clearly. The scrambled region
created from the sea horse in (b) is white and lies on the right in the
control stimulus (d) in the bottom row.
‘high-denotative’ region provided a good match to a
representation of a known object in memory (see Ap-
pendix A for a list of the object portrayed by the
high-denotative regions). High-denotative regions oc-
curred equally often in black and in white and on the
left and right sides of the shared central contour. The
regions adjacent to the high-denotative regions of the
experimental stimuli were ‘low-denotative’ in that they
did not depict a known object when they were seen as
figures. (Less than 22% of control observers agreed on
a single interpretation for any of the low denotative
regions when they were seen as figures).
The other half of the stimuli (N24) were control
stimuli. In the control stimuli, shown in the bottom row
of Fig. 5, both adjacent regions were low in denotivity.
However, one region was created from a high-denota-
tive region in the experimental set by breaking the
central contour of the high-denotative regions into
parts delimited by two successive concave cusps along
the contour. These parts were rearranged spatially by
hand (maintaining their polarity) until the resulting
scrambled region was low in denotivity (i.e. failed to
elicit greater than 22% between-observer agreement on
what object it portrayed in a pilot experiment. Because
of the low between-observer agreement about the object
depicted by the scrambled regions and other low-deno-
tative regions, we assumed that those regions did not
provide a good match to memory representations cod-
ing the structure of the object. Like high-denotative
regions, scrambled regions occurred equally often in
black and in white and on the left and right sides of the
shared central contour. The regions adjacent to the
scrambled regions of the control stimuli were low deno-
tative, as were the regions adjacent to the high-denota-
tive regions of the experimental stimuli.
High-denotative regions of experimental stimuli and
scrambled regions of control stimuli will be called ‘crit-
ical regions’. These critical regions were equated on
variables known to be relevant to figure-ground assign-
ment (e.g. area and convexity), but differed in their
goodness of fit to object representations. Thus, the
stimuli in the OMEFA test were designed to assess
object memory contributions to figure assignment. Spe-
cifically, object memory effects on figure assignment are
implicated if observers see a larger percentage of high
denotative regions of the experimental stimuli as figures
than scrambled regions of the control stimuli (see Peter-
son, 1994a).
The stimuli ranged from 3.5 to 8.9 cm in width and
from 8.0 to 13.6 cm in height. Each black and white
(B&W) stimulus was drawn on a white sheet of 21.25
27.5 cm paper and surrounded by a frame of B&W
random-dots, approximately 1619.5 cm, which left a
second white frame surrounding the B&W frame. Each
sheet of paper was laid on top of a second sheet of
2330.5 cm black paper, that provided a third, black,
2.3.3. Test of object memory effects on figure
assignment (OMEFA)
In experiments 1A–C, a set of 48 displays was used
to assess object memory effects on figure assignment.
Samples are shown in Fig. 5; these stimuli are a subset
of those used by Peterson, Rapcsak and Gerhardstein
(1994a,b) and Peterson et al. (1998). Each stimulus
comprised two adjacent regions sharing a contour; one
region was black and the other region was white. The
black and white regions were approximately equal in
area. Half of the stimuli (N24) were experimental
stimuli. In the experimental stimuli, shown in the top
row of Fig. 5, one region depicted a mono-oriented
familiar object when it was seen as the figure:object;
this object was identified correctly by at least 65% of
pilot observers. Therefore, it was assumed that this
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frame. These three frames were employed to eliminate
any bias toward seeing black regions as figure that
might have been present had the pictures been pre-
sented on a plain white background.
Eight additional stimuli comprised a familiarization
set3. Six of the familiarization stimuli depicted whole
known objects in either white (N3) or black (N3)
silhouette on a contrasting ground surrounded by the
three frames described above. The whole objects in the
familiarization set were closed and smaller in area than
their surrounds so that the configural cues of closure
and relative area would operate to specify that they
were seen as figures rather than grounds (Harrower,
1936; Rubin, 1958; Hochberg, 1971; Rubin, 1958). The
objects depicted in the familiarization set were a cat, a
windmill, a map of the state of Texas, a hatchet, and an
airplane. Two additional familiarization stimuli, shown
last, were half versions of the whole objects (the cat and
the windmill) in the same style as those shown in Fig.
6a,b.
2.3.4. Real:unreal objects test
AD was also tested on sub-test 10 of the Birmingham
Object Recognition Battery (BORB) (Riddoch &
Humphreys, 1993). In this test, observers are asked to
discriminate between real and unreal objects, where
common objects and animals are rendered unreal by
substituting a part of one animal or object for a similar
part of another animal or object. In the easy condition,
the substituted part differs substantially from the origi-
nal part (e.g. a horse’s head is replaced with a chicken’s
head. In the hard condition, the substituted part differs
only slightly from the original part (e.g. the head of a
snake is substituted for the head of a swan). Control
observers were not tested on the BORB because Rid-
doch and Humphreys (1993) published norms for the
test.
2.4. Procedure
AD was tested three times at Hoˆpital Universitaire
Henri Mondor by BdG. Control participants were
tested at the University of Arizona.
2.4.1. Experiment 1A
In experiment 1A, AD was first given the test of the
effectiveness of Gestalt configural cues to figure assign-
ment. She was told that, for each display, either the
black or the white regions would appear to be figures in
that they would appear to stand out as having a definite
shape, whereas the regions of the other color would
appear to form a background to the shaped figures. For
each display, AD was asked to report whether the black
or the white regions appeared to stand out as figures.
AD had no trouble understanding these instructions,
which were administered while she viewed a sample
display in which the black regions were substantially
smaller in area than the white regions. She responded
to each of the experimental displays immediately and
confidently. Stimuli remained present until response.
Immediately after the Gestalt configural cues test,
AD was given the OMEFA test. AD viewed these
stimuli one at a time and reported whether the black or
the white region appeared to be figure, as she had done
for the set of displays testing the Gestalt configural
cues. She had no trouble transferring to the OMEFA
test the instructions she had followed on the Gestalt
configural cues test. Her ‘figure’ responses to each
stimulus were immediate and confident, as before. After
she reported which regions appeared to be figure, AD
was asked to identify any familiar objects she saw.
Again, these stimuli remained present until response.
Control participants were given the Gestalt
configural cues test and the OMEFA test in the same
order as AD.
2.4.2. Experiment 1B
In experiment 1B, conducted 3 months after experi-
ment 1A, AD was given the OMEFA test a second
time. This experiment assesses the reliability of the
results of experiment 1A.
Fig. 6. The percentages of figure reports made for high-denotative
regions of the experimental stimuli and scrambled regions of the
control stimuli in experiment 1 by (a) eleven elderly female control
participants; (b) AD, experiment 1A, upright displays; (c) AD, exper-
iment 1B, upright displays. Percentages are shown separately for
high-denotative and scrambled regions lying on the left and the right
sides of the central contour.
3 The familiarization set was not shown to AD or to the control
participants tested in experiment 1. We describe the familiarization
set here because it was used in experiment 2.
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Table 2
Percentage of stimuli testing individual and combined Gestalt configural cues seen as figures by female control participants, AD, male control
participants, and WG (tested on two occasions)a
Female controlsStimulus AD Male controls WG (1) WG (2)
Cutoff N % NMean Cutoff N % %Mean
3:4 75 2:4 50Convexity 86.4 28.5 4:4 100 87.5 62.5
29.7 4:4 100 4:4Symmetry 54.5 3.1 3:4 75 81.2 100
62.55:862.5 62.5 5:8S vs Cb*b 87.581.8 62.3 8:8 100
2:2 100 2:2 100(SC)* vs C 72.7 22.9 2:2 100 100
502:4502:425(SC)* vs S 7570.4 41.7 4:4 100
a S, symmetry; C, convexity.
b In cases of cue conflict, asterisks (*) indicate the cue for which choices were coded. Cut-off scores are two standard deviations below means.
Gestalt configural cues test made by the control
participants and AD. In all cases, AD scored above a
cut-off located two standard deviations below the
control mean, indicating that her use of the Gestalt
configural cues for figure assignment is intact.
We note that some of the control observers did not use
symmetry as a cue to figure assignment, either alone or
in combination with convexity. Others did not
use convexity as a cue to figure assignment, either
alone or in combination with symmetry. Because the
number of stimuli used in this test was small, we do not
dwell on these results in great detail. However, we are
currently testing the use of Gestalt cues in young and
elderly observers using a larger set of stimuli. The
comparison of AD to the control participants suggests
that AD’s use of the Gestalt configural cues is not
impaired.
2.5.1.2. OMEFA test. The percentages of critical regions
seen as figures by both the control participants and AD
are shown in Fig. 6a,b. Figure reports are shown
separately for critical regions lying on the left and right
sides of the central contour. As can be seen in Fig. 6a,
object memory effects on figure assignment were evident
in the figure reports of the control participants, who
reported seeing a larger percentage of high-
denotative regions of the experimental stimuli as figures
(90.1%; range 79.2–100%) than scrambled regions of the
control stimuli (69.2%; range 54.1–79.2%), t(10)7.799,
PB0.001. Individual difference scores (difference be-
tween the percentages of high-denotative regions of
experimental stimuli and scrambled regions of
the control stimuli seen as figures) ranged from 4.24 to
33.2%.
2.4.3. Experiment 1C
In experiment 1C, conducted 1 week after experiment
1A, AD was given an inverted version of the OMEFA
test. This experiment assessed whether AD reported
seeing high-denotative regions of experimental stimuli as
figures less often in inverted compared to upright dis-
plays, as normal observers do in experiments employing
brief, masked exposures (e.g. Gibson & Peterson, 1994;
Peterson & Gibson, 1994a).
We did not test the elderly control participants from
experiment 1A in experiment 1C for the following reason.
On the basis of chance alone, the high-denotative regions
of inverted experimental displays should be seen as
figures (objects) on approximately half the trials. Pro-
vided that object recognition processes are intact (as they
are for the control participants), inverted objects can be
recognized (albeit more slowly than upright objects).
Therefore, we expected that control participants would
recognize the objects portrayed by the inverted figures on
some proportion of the trials. We were concerned that
recognizing inverted objects in the displays might lead the
control participants to adopt different strategies with
inverted compared to upright displays.
We did not have this concern for AD because of her
visual agnosia. Therefore, we chose to compare AD’s
performance with inverted displays to her own perfor-
mance with upright displays. Peterson et al. (1991;
Peterson & Gibson, 1994a,b; Gibson & Peterson, 1994)
used within-subject comparisons as well.
2.4.4. Experiment 1D
Experiment 1D was conducted during the same testing
session as experiment 1C. In experiment 1D, AD was
given the real:unreal objects sub-test (10) of the BORB.
In order to assess whether performance on this test was
orientation dependent, we administered it in both upright
and inverted orientations.
2.5. Results
2.5.1. Experiment 1A
2.5.1.1. Gestalt cues. Table 2 shows responses to the
4 The participant with this low difference score was biased to see
left regions as figure, similar to the right-hemisphere-damaged partic-
ipants tested by Peterson et al. (1998) and to college students under
right visual field presentation conditions (Peterson & Gerhardstein,
under review). Her difference score for right regions was large
(33.3%), but was reversed for left regions (25%).
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No statistical differences were obtained between dif-
ference scores obtained for critical regions lying on the
left versus the right of the central contour, t(10)1.24,
n.s. We defined a bias to see critical regions lying on
one side of the central contour as a tendency to
see 75% or more of both types of critical regions as
figures on that side (see also Peterson et al., 1998). By
this measure, six control participants were biased
to see left critical regions as figures and three were
biased to see right critical regions as figures. These
biases may reveal attentional biases mediated by the
contralateral hemisphere in these observers (see Peter-
son et al., 1998; Peterson & Gerhardstein, under re-
view).
Object memory effects on figure assignment were
evident in AD’s figure reports as well, as can be seen in
Fig. 6b. AD reported seeing the high-denotative regions
of the experimental stimuli as figures more often than
chance (18:24 (75%), z2.246, P0. 013). In contrast,
she did not see the scrambled regions of the control
stimuli as figures more often than chance (11:24 (46%),
z0.24, P0.42). The percentage of high-denotative
regions AD saw as figure was approximately the same
on the left and right sides of the central contour. The
percentage of scrambled regions she saw as figure was
larger on the right than on the left of the central
contour, although this difference was not significant in
a two-tailed test, z1.759, PB0.10.
AD reported seeing both the high-denotative
regions and the scrambled regions as figures somewhat
less often than the control participants, but, in both
cases, her responses fell within two standard deviations
of the control mean. The percentage of the high-
denotative regions of the experimental stimuli AD
reported seeing as figures was larger than the
percentage of scrambled regions of the control stimuli
she reported seeing as figures, z2.054, PB0.03. AD’s
difference score (29%) fell within the control partici-
pants’ range (given above). AD’s substantial difference
score affirms that object memory effects on figure as-
signment are present even though her ability to
identify objects consciously is severely impaired. Thus,
there is no evidence that AD’s performance on the
OMEFA test is abnormal. It seems clear that
conscious object recognition is not necessary for object
memory effects on figure assignment. Next, we report
identification measures obtained as part of the OMEFA
test.
2.5.1.3. Identification accuracy. During the OMEFA
test, participants were asked to identify the object por-
trayed by the figure if it was familiar. Control partici-
pants accurately identified 83.2% of the familiar objects
portrayed by the high-denotative region they saw as
figures (range: 68.4–95.8%). As expected on the basis of
her performance on other tasks requiring object iden-
tification, AD was severely impaired at identifying the
objects portrayed by the high-denotative regions she
saw as figures (28%). For the remainder of the high-de-
notative regions, AD simply said that she saw nothing
familiar.
Thus, the identification part of the OMEFA test
confirms that AD’s ability to consciously recognize
objects is severely impaired. Because AD could identify
a small percentage of the objects portrayed by the
high-denotative regions she saw as figures, we recalcu-
lated the percentage of high-denotative regions she saw
as figure without these stimuli (66.7%). A new differ-
ence score was also calculated for AD, using this new
percentage. AD’s new difference (20.9%) score re-
mained within the normal range even when the high-de-
notative regions she was able to identify were removed
from consideration.
The fact that AD reported a larger percentage of
high-denotative regions of experimental stimuli as
figures than scrambled regions of control stimuli indi-
cates that, even though her conscious object recognition
is severely impaired, access to memories of object struc-
ture from visual input occurs quickly enough to affect
figure assignment. Thus, AD’s performance on the test
of object memories on figure assignment indicates that
conscious object recognition is not necessary for object
memory effects on figure assignment.
2.5.2. Experiment 1B
As can be seen in Fig. 6c, effects of object memories
on figure assignment were still evident in AD’s figure
reports for regions lying on the right side of the central
contour when she was tested 3 months later5. AD
reported seeing high-denotative regions lying on the
right side of the central contour of experimental stimuli
as figure more often than expected on the basis of
chance (75%; z2.246, PB0.013), whereas she did not
report seeing scrambled regions lying on the right side
of the central contour of control stimuli as figures more
often than expected on the basis of chance (33%; z
0.866, P0.20). For regions lying on the right side of
the central contour, AD reported seeing a larger per-
centage of the high-denotative regions than the scram-
bled regions as figures, z2.919, PB0.02. These
results suggest that the evidence for object memory
effects on figure assignment obtained in experiment 1A
was reliable.
5 We investigated whether AD reported particular high-denotative
and scrambled regions consistently as figures or grounds across
experiments 1A and B. If she did it would raise a concern about the
independence of the different tests. Only 25% of the scrambled
regions were assigned the same figural status on these two test
occasions, suggesting that for AD, memory of the figure status
assigned in experiment 1A did not influence her figure reports in
experiment 1B.
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However, no effects of object memories on figure
assignment were evident in AD’s figure reports for
regions lying in the left side of the central contour.
Indeed, for critical regions lying on the left side of the
central contour, AD reported a slightly larger percent-
age of scrambled regions of the control stimuli as
figures than high-denotative regions of the experimental
stimuli. AD’s pattern of performance on the OMEFA
test in experiment 1B is similar to that of college
students who view brief exposures of these displays in
the right visual field (RVF) (Peterson & Gerhardstein,
under review) and to that of right-hemisphere (RH)
damaged participants (Peterson et al., 1998). Like those
two groups of participants, AD showed a bias to see
left regions as figures; this bias was evident in a rela-
tively larger percentage of figure reports for left (83.3%)
versus right (33.3%) scrambled regions, z3.519, PB
0.01. This pattern of performance has been taken to
indicate an attentional bias mediated by the left hemi-
sphere (LH). Despite her bias to see left regions as
figure, however, AD’s figure reports for critical regions
lying on the right side of the contour showed effects of
object memories. The same is true for both RH-dam-
aged participants and normal participants viewing
briefly exposed displays in the RVF: despite their bias
to see left critical regions as figures, their figure reports
for critical regions lying on the right side of the contour
reveal effects of object memories (Peterson & Gerhard-
stein, under review; Peterson et al., 1998).
AD identified only one of the objects portrayed by
the high-denotative figures in this testing session; it was
a figure lying on the left of the central contour. Thus, it
is clear that her preference for seeing right high-denota-
tive regions of experimental stimuli as figures over right
scrambled regions of control stimuli cannot be at-
tributed to those high-denotative regions she can
identify.
2.5.3. Experiment 1C
Like normal observers under brief exposure condi-
tions, AD showed no effects of object memory on
figure assignment when viewing an inverted version of
the OMEFA test. Indeed, in experiment 1C, AD did
not report seeing the high-denotative regions of the
experimental stimuli as figure any more often than
expected on the basis of chance (58.4%, z0.612,
P0.27). Her figure reports for high-denotative re-
gions of the experimental stimuli and for scrambled
regions of the control stimuli (41.7%) did not differ
significantly, z1.158, P\0.12. Thus, for AD as for
normal observers tested under laboratory conditions
(e.g. Peterson et al., 1991; Gibson & Peterson, 1994;
Peterson & Gibson, 1994a,b), access to memories of
object structure is slowed sufficiently for inverted dis-
plays such that their influence on figure assignment is
no longer evident.
Not surprisingly, AD did not identify any of the
objects portrayed by high-denotative figures while view-
ing the inverted version of the OMEFA test.
2.5.4. Experiment 1D
AD’s performance on the real:unreal objects subtest
of the BORB is shown in Table 3. For both easy (72%)
and hard (59%) upright stimuli, AD’s accuracy scores
were lower than the cut-off established by Riddoch and
Humphreys (1993) on the basis of normal performance
(92 and 80%, respectively). AD’s scores were also below
the cut-off for RH-damaged participants, although they
were slightly above the cot-off for LH-damaged partici-
pants (see Table 3).
For easy BORB stimuli, AD performed better in the
upright condition than in the inverted condition, z
2.034, PB0.03 (see Table 3). The same trend was
present for hard BORB stimuli, although the difference
between upright and inverted conditions was not statis-
tically significant, z1.20, P\0.11. To our knowl-
edge, no one has shown previously that performance on
the real:unreal objects test of the BORB can vary with
stimulus orientation. The orientation-dependency of
performance on the real:unreal objects test provides
additional evidence to support the hypothesis that that
memories of object structure are accessed to perform
that task.
2.6. Discussion
For AD, object memory effects on figure assignment
appear to be spared even though conscious object
recognition is severely impaired. In experiment 1A, AD
reported seeing a larger percentage of high-denotative
regions of upright experimental stimuli as figures than
scrambled regions of upright control. In experiment 1B,
AD showed a bias to see left critical regions as figure,
a pattern of behavior taken to reflect an attentional bias
Table 3
Accuracy scores for BORB sub-test ten real:unreal objects testa
Easy Hard
%N N%
AD upright 23:32 72 5919:32
4414:324715:32AD inverted
Norms (upright) 95 84
Cut-off 92 80
75LH-damaged (upright)
67.5Cut-off
RH-damaged (upright) 87.5
Cut-off 77.7
a AD viewed both upright and inverted displays. Norms were
gathered from participants viewing upright displays.
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of the LH. Despite this attentional bias, AD’s figure
reports for right critical regions showed the same pat-
tern as experiment 1A. She reported a larger percentage
of high-denotative regions of the experimental
stimuli as figure than scrambled regions of the control
stimuli. A substantial difference between figure reports
for high-denotative regions of the experimental stimuli
and scrambled regions of the control stimuli is one
signature of object memory effects on figure assign-
ment.
Another signature of object memory effects on figure
assignment is that they diminish or disappear when
experimental stimuli are inverted (Peterson, 1994a). In
experiment 1C, AD did not report seeing high-denota-
tive regions of inverted experimental stimuli as figures
more often than expected on the basis of chance.
Although AD could not identify objects consciously,
it seems that her memories of object structure are
accessed sufficiently quickly and sufficiently well to
affect figure assignment. Thus, the OMEFA test is a
new implicit test of access to memories of object struc-
ture. In experiment 1D, we measured AD’s perfor-
mance on another implicit test of access to memories of
object structure, the real:unreal objects test. AD per-
formed substantially below the level of control partici-
pants on the real:unreal objects test, a level of
performance which has been taken to reflect impaired
visual knowledge about object structure (Riddoch &
Humphreys, 1993). That AD’s performance was outside
the normal range on the BORB real:unreal objects test,
yet within normal range on the OMEFA test might
indicate that the OMEFA test is a more sensitive
implicit test of access to memories of object structure
than the real:unreal test. In the OMEFA test, the
viewer has only to report which of two adjacent regions
appears to be the figure; no judgments are required
about whether or not depicted objects really exist, as
they are in the real:unreal objects test. For this reason,
the OMEFA test may provide a measure of quick
access to memories of object structure that is relatively
uncontaminated by higher order processes. Alterna-
tively, it is possible that successful performance on the
real:unreal objects test of the BORB requires more
detailed object processing than is needed for object
memory effects on figure assignment.
One might question whether AD’s reports on the
OMEFA test truly reflect the first perceived figure
assignment. An alternative possibility is that her figure
reports for high-denotative regions of experimental
stimuli might reflect a greater post-figure-assignment
feeling of familiarity for those regions than for their
adjacent low-denotative regions, or for either of the two
regions in the control stimuli. In other words, it is
possible that AD reversed the figure assignment of the
displays in the OMEFA test before making her figure
report. If so, then the OMEFA test may not assess the
state of early access to memories of object structure.
Instead, it may assess whether or not a feeling a famil-
iarity is intact after figure assignment. Although it is
not possible to be certain whether or not AD had time
to reverse the figure-ground assignment and choose
which of the two regions was more familiar, we do not
think this alternative explanation is correct.
One reason for rejecting this alternative interpreta-
tion of AD’s performance on the OMEFA test is that
she performed outside the normal range on the BORB
real:unreal object test but within the normal range on
the OMEFA test. Hence, it seems that her figure re-
ports in the OMEFA test are not tapping the same
familiarity response tapped by the real:unreal objects
test.
A second reason for rejecting the alternative interpre-
tation is that AD performed the OMEFA test immedi-
ately after reporting figure assignment in the Gestalt
configural cues test which comprised no familiar
shapes. She continued to respond with the same imme-
diacy and confidence of report on the OMEFA test as
she had on the Gestalt configural cues test.
A third reason for rejecting the alternative interpreta-
tion of AD’s performance is that a patient with appar-
ently intact conscious object recognition, who was
tested in experiment 2, did not show any evidence of
object memory effects on figure assignment. One would
expect that the strategy of reversing the initial organiza-
tion and choosing the more familiar object would cer-
tainly be available to someone who can recognize
objects consciously. That it apparently was not has
implications for the interpretation of AD’s perfor-
mance, and for understanding figure assignment pro-
cesses, as discussed next.
3. Experiment 2
In experiment 2, we tested a second brain-damaged
individual, WG, who was able to recognize objects
consciously, as assessed by standard measures. WG did
not present any complaints about object recognition.
He reported only that sometimes when he turned his
glance to a portion of space he had looked at previ-
ously, he saw an object that had not been there before.
This phenomenon could reflect mild simultanagnosia
(see below).
Alternatively, this phenomenon could occur if quick
access to memories of object structure were impaired in
situations in which object memory effects were the only
cue to figure assignment, as they are in the OMEFA
test6. In such cases, without object memory effects on
6 It is probably rare for only one cue to determine figure assign-
ment in the real world, regardless of whether the cue is a configural
cue or an object memory cue.
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Table 4
WG’s preserved and impaired abilitiesa
Preser6ed
Subjective contours
Line bisection
Line cancellation
Copying hierarchical stimuli
Reading
Overlapping objects with overlap lessened (97%)
Perceptual memory (Snodgrass & Corwin, 1988)
Priming for possible objects (Schacter, 1994)
Color perception
Stereo fusion
Silhouette recognition (18:18)
Hooper task (100% correct)
Boston naming task (55:60)
Identifying colored photographs of objects (12:12)
Disoriented silhouettes (Warrington & James, 1989)
Dot location
Upper left quadrant (13:14)
Lower left quadrant (9:12)
Impaired
Mooney faces (0:3)
Street figures (2:18)
Famous faces (11:26)
Matching unfamiliar faces (8:12)
S:D judgments, unfamiliar faces (13:20)
Overlapping objects task (75%)
Telegraph boy picture (simultanagnosia)
Snodgrass and Corwin picture completion
VOSP
Figure-ground (0)*
Incomplete letters (0)*
*He had an extremely conservative threshold for response, and
refused to continue after completing only a few trials
a VOSP, visual object and space perception test (Warrington &
James, 1989); S:Dsame:different.
3.1. Method
3.1.1. Participants
Control participants were five normal (non-brain-
damaged) elderly men from southern Arizona, who
volunteered for this study (mean age69.4 years;
range 63–75 years). Four of these men participated in
the test of Gestalt configural effects on image segrega-
tion. The brain-damaged participant, WG, was tested
at the Veterans Administration Medical Center in Tuc-
son by MAP, PCG and SZR.
As part of experiment 2, AD was tested a third time
with an upright version of the OMEFA test, this time
with the same instructions given to WG (see Section
3.3). This test took place 11 months after experiment
1B.
3.1.2. Case history
WG was a 71-year old male, who presented with a
right homonymous hemianopia that was denser in the
lower quadrant. He had sustained a right-occipital
stroke in 1985 and a left occipital stroke 9 weeks prior
to our first testing sessions between mid-January and
early February 1993. Left visual field deficits evident
after the right-occipital stroke had resolved by the time
of test. WG’s lesions were localized in Brodman areas
18 and 19 of the RH and areas 17, 18 and 19 of the LH.
A map of WG’s lesion locations is shown in Fig. 3b.
As can be seen in Table 4, WG performed well within
normal range on the Boston Naming Task, a standard
test of conscious object recognition. In addition, WG
identified all of the common objects in a set of 12
photographs developed by PCG and MAP. In these
tests of conscious object recognition, there are many
redundant configural cues to figure assignment; hence
figure assignment does not depend upon contributions
from object memories, as it does in the OMEFA test.
WG evidenced mild simultanagnosia, in that he did
not perform very well on the standard overlapping
objects task. However, when less extreme amounts of
overlap were used, he could identify all of the objects
(see Table 4). In addition, WG’s identification of stim-
uli requiring contour completion was impaired. He
performed poorly on Mooney faces, incomplete letters,
both Gollin (1960) and Snodgrass and Corwin (1988)
figures, and a set of fragmented objects developed by
PCG and MAP in which the contour minima and
maxima were recoverable despite the presence of frag-
mentation (see Biederman, 1987). Thus, WG clearly
had some problems recognizing objects under degraded
conditions.
In addition to the tests already mentioned, WG was
tested with a set of 18 silhouettes of common objects,
each centered on a page. He identified all of these
objects correctly as well as all six of the silhouettes
comprising the familiarization set for the OMEFA test.
figure assignment, high-denotative regions of the
visual field would be seen as figures approximately
half the time, and as ground the other half the time.
When seen as grounds, high-denotative regions would
appear shapeless and the objects they portray would
not be recognized. When seen as figures, the high-deno-
tative regions would appear to have a definite shape,
and the objects they portray would be recognized,
provided that other damage did not interfere with
figure recognition. If by chance alone, WG saw a
high-denotative region as ground on his first glance at a
region of the visual field in which object memories were
the only cue to figure assignment and as figure on some
subsequent glance, he might see a new object in the
second glance. For this reason, we decided to adminis-
ter the OMEFA test and both the Gestalt configural
cue test to WG and five age-matched male control
observers.
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Finally, WG made no errors in identifying a small set
of partially occluded common objects (N6), five of
which were silhouettes. Thus, despite some difficulties
identifying degraded objects, WG’s object recognition is
relatively intact.
3.2. Stimuli
The set of stimuli used to test Gestalt configural cues
in experiment 1 was used in experiment 2 as well. The
set of stimuli used in the OMEFA test was larger than
the set used in experiment 1. There were 30 experimen-
tal stimuli in the set used in this experiment (rather
than 24); the number of control stimuli (N24) was
the same in both sets. This set was the full set used by
Peterson et al. (1994, 1998).
3.3. Procedure
All participants were given the Gestalt configural
cues test and a test of silhouette recognition prior to the
OMEFA test. WG was allowed to view the stimuli
where he could see them best.
The instructions given to WG and the control partic-
ipants for the OMEFA test were different from those
given in experiment 1. Participants in experiment 2 were
told that some of the displays they viewed would
portray familiar objects, but that many would not; they
would portray novel shapes created by the experi-
menters. Participants were asked to identify any known
object they saw and to state whether it was black or
white. They were instructed that, when they did not see
a known object, they were to make an ‘object decision’;
that is, they were to report which region (black or
white) they considered more likely to be an object.
The use of these different instructions resulted in
differences in response coding. Attempts to identify the
object portrayed by any region (whether correct or
incorrect) were taken to indicate that region was seen a
figure (because recognition is coupled to figural status).
In addition, object decisions were taken to indicate that
a region had a definite shape and was seen as figure.
Identification responses were combined with object de-
cisions to form an overall object decision percentage for
each stimulus type. These overall object decisions are
the primary data discussed below. In addition, identifi-
cation accuracy was calculated for the high-denotative
regions of the experimental stimuli.
3.4. Results
3.4.1. Gestalt configural cues
As can be seen in Table 2, WG’s responses to Gestalt
configural cues fall within the normal range, established
by either the male or the female control participants.
His response to convexity is weak, but some control
observers had an even weaker response7. We note that
the Gestalt test included only a small number of test
trials in each condition, so the results may not be an
accurate index of Gestalt configural cue contributions
to figure assignment.
3.4.2. Object memory effects on figure assignment
Fig. 7 shows the results of experiment 2. The five
male control participants made a larger percentage of
overall object decisions for high-denotative regions of
experimental stimuli than for scrambled regions of con-
trol stimuli, t(4)9.699, PB0.001 (Fig. 7a). The ob-
ject decisions made by one control observer for both
critical region types were at ceiling for right regions (a
pattern suggesting an attentional bias mediated by the
RH). Nevertheless, this control participant made more
overall object decisions for left high-denotative regions
of the experimental stimuli (94%) than for left scram-
bled regions of the control stimuli (60%), z2.949,
PB0.002. All other control observers made more over-
all object decisions for high-denotative regions of the
experimental stimuli than scrambled regions of the
control stimuli on both the left and the right sides of
the central contour. Thus effects of object memories on
figure assignment were evident in all control observers.
In contrast to these five male control participants
(but like four of the female control participants in
Fig. 7. The percentages of overall object decisions made for high-de-
notative regions of the experimental stimuli and scrambled regions of
the control stimuli in experiment 2 by (a) five elderly male control
participants; (b) WG; (c) AD. Object decisions for regions on the left
and right sides of the central contour are shown separately.
7 Control observers who had a weak response to convexity never-
theless showed effects of object memories on figure assignment in the
OMEFA test.
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experiment 1A, and like AD in experiment 1B), WG
was biased to see regions lying on the left of the central
contour as figure, regardless of whether they were high
or low in denotivity (a pattern suggesting LH atten-
tional bias). Furthermore, in contrast to all other par-
ticipants tested, including AD, WG showed no evidence
of object memory effects on figure assignment in his
overall object decisions about either left or right re-
gions. Indeed, WG made a slightly larger percentage of
object decisions for scrambled regions of the control
stimuli than for high-denotative regions of the experi-
mental stimuli. This pattern of performance is highly
unusual. Even when left or right biases have been
reported in other non-brain damaged observers (and in
many brain-damaged observers), object recognition ef-
fects on image segregation were typically evident in
their responses to regions lying on the other side of the
central contour (Peterson et al., 1998). However, WG
failed to show influences from object memories on
figure assignment for right regions as well as for left
regions.
For WG, object memories do not affect figure assign-
ment. Were object memory effects present, he should
have made a larger percentage of overall object deci-
sions for high-denotative regions of the experimental
stimuli than for scrambled regions of the control stim-
uli, but he did not. Thus, WG’s performance indicates
that conscious object recognition is not sufficient for
object memory effects on figure assignment.
3.4.3. Identification accuracy
Control participants identified 80% of the high-deno-
tative regions they saw as objects. For those high-deno-
tative regions he chose as objects, WG’s identification
accuracy was normal (79%)8. Thus, it seems that once
figure assignment has occurred, WG can accurately
identify familiar objects among the figures. This inter-
pretation accords with WG’s normal performance on
tests of object recognition in which isolated line draw-
ings or silhouettes were presented for identification.
WG correctly identified a larger percentage of high-
denotative figures lying on the left than on the right
side of the central contour (92.7 vs. 57.1%), z2.01,
PB0.06. Some of the control observers showed similar
trends, but none showed a significant difference be-
tween right-left identification accuracy, Ps\0.12. Nor
was a significant right-left difference found in the con-
trol means, P\0.20.
3.4.4. Object decisions re6isited
WG could recognize objects, and clearly could recog-
nize the objects portrayed by the high-denotative re-
gions he saw as figure in the OMEFA test. Therefore, it
could be argued that even if object memories did not
affect the initial figure assignment, WG could have
reversed the figure assignment in the experimental stim-
uli in search of a familiar object. Such a strategy should
result in more overall object decisions for high-denota-
tive regions of experimental stimuli than for scrambled
regions of control stimuli. Consequently, one might find
it puzzling that WG didn’t make more overall object
decisions for high-denotative regions of experimental
stimuli than for scrambled regions of control stimuli.
Because WG commented verbally on what he was
seeing at different times during the trial, we believe that
he did attempt to use such a reversal strategy, at least
some of the time. However, when WG did not see a
high-denotative region of an experimental stimulus as
figure initially, he was unable to recognize the familiar
object it portrayed when he immediately reversed the
figure assignment such that the high-denotative region
was the figure. This observation is important because it
suggests that object memories matching regions deter-
mined to be grounds are inhibited for some time follow-
ing figure assignment, as Peterson (1999b) has
proposed.
3.4.5. AD’s object decisions
As can be seen in Fig. 7c, despite the use of different
instructions, AD’s performance in experiment 2 was
almost identical to her performance in experiment 1B
(compare Fig. 6c and Fig. 7c)9. These results indicate
that the differences between AD and WG cannot be
attributed to the use of different instructions. Consis-
tent with this finding, the data obtained from the
control participants in experiments 1 and 2 were similar
as well (compare Fig. 6a and Fig. 7a), which in itself
suggests that the different instructions did not alter
behavior substantially10.
3.5. Discussion
Experiment 2 demonstrates that conscious object
recognition is not sufficient for object memory effects
on figure assignment. WG was able to accurately recog-
nize the objects portrayed by high-denotative regions
that he saw as figures. Nevertheless, he failed to show
any influences from object memories on figure
assignment.
9 AD assigned only 37.5% of the scrambled regions of the control
the same status (as either figure or ground) in experiments 1B and 2.
10 Furthermore, the performance of 12 normal female observers
given the OMEFA test with the object decision instructions used in
experiment 2 was compared with that of the 11 female control
observers given the OMEFA test with the figure-ground instructions
used in experiment 1. The means and standard deviations obtained in
all conditions were approximately the same under the two different
instruction conditions.
8 Recall, however, that WG reported a relatively small percentage
of high-denotative regions as figures.
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Fig. 8. Overall object decisions made by WG for high-denotative
regions of the experimental stimuli and scrambled regions of the
control stimuli in experiment 3, shown separately for regions lying on
the left and the right sides of the central contour.
reports did not reflect initial figure assignment; and
therefore, did not reflect object memory effects on
figure assignment. Rather, on this alternative interpre-
tation, her figure reports might reflect a relative famil-
iarity judgment generated after each of the two adjacent
regions in a display was seen as figure successively.
However, WG’s performance shows what performance
on the OMEFA test would be like without object
memory effects. His data are not at all similar to AD’s.
Instead, WG’s performance suggests that shape pro-
cessing is inhibited on regions determined to be
grounds, which in turn suggests that a reversal strategy
would be ineffective. The fact that the pattern of per-
formance found in WG, an individual with good con-
scious object recognition, was different from that found
in both AD and normal observers provides no support
for the alternative interpretation. The interpretation we
have proposed, that AD’s figure reports reflect the
spared operation of quick, early access to memories of
object structure, remains viable.
AD’s performance can be used to limit the interpreta-
tion that can be given to WG’s performance, as well.
Taken in isolation, the pattern of performance found in
WG might be obtained if the OMEFA test were more
difficult than the tests used to evaluate conscious object
recognition. Evidence against a difficulty interpretation
is provided by the fact that AD showed the opposite
pattern of preserved and impaired abilities.
4. Experiment 3
In experiment 3, we tested WG with the OMEFA test
and the Gestalt configural cues test 1.5 years after
experiment 2 in order to investigate whether his brain
damage interfered with initial access to object memories
permanently or temporarily. During the second test
administration, he was given the same instructions he
had been given during the first test administration (see
experiment 2). WG was also given the test assessing
Gestalt configural cues again.
4.1. Results and discussion
WG’s responses to the Gestalt configural cues are
shown in Table 2. Once again, his responses to convex-
ity were weak, although in all cases, his responses to
Gestalt configural cues were at or above the age-
matched cut-off score computed from either the male or
the female control data. Thus, WG’s responses to the
Gestalt cue stimuli were stable across the two testing
sessions.
As can be seen in Fig. 8, WG continued to show a
strong preference for seeing left regions as figure in the
OMEFA test. However, this time, object memory ef-
fects on figure assignment were evident for right re-
How might we then explain WG’s combination of
preserved conscious object recognition abilities and im-
paired quick access to memories of object structure? It
would be reasonable to suppose that conscious object
recognition requires the activation of memories of ob-
ject structure as well as semantic and functional knowl-
edge. Given that WG’s conscious object recognition
abilities are relatively spared, that implies that his mem-
ories of object structure must be activated eventually,
even if they are not activated quickly enough to influ-
ence figure assignment. Therefore, we suppose that
WG’s brain damage slowed, or otherwise interfered
with, initial access to memories of object structure, but
did not eliminate it altogether (since his conscious
object recognition was spared, at least as measured by
standard tests). An analog exists in normal observers
for whom inverting stimuli from their normal upright
slows access to object memories sufficiently to remove
object memory effects on figure assignment, but does
not prevent conscious object recognition. For normal
observers, conscious object recognition is slowed by
stimulus inversion, but it is not eliminated. On this
hypothesis, it would be reasonable to expect that WG
would require more time than normal participants
would to identify upright common objects. Unfortu-
nately, we measured WG’s identification accuracy, but
not his identification latencies.
We return to a consideration of what WG’s pattern
of performance suggests regarding the question of
whether or not AD’s figure-ground reports were mea-
suring object memory effects on figure assignment per
se. An alternative interpretation was that AD’s figure
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gions. High-denotative regions of experimental stimuli
(71%) were seen as figure more often than chance,
PB0.01, whereas scrambled regions of control stimuli
were not (42%). The difference between these two per-
centages was large (29%), and within the range of
differences shown by control observers.
WG’s identification of the objects portrayed by the
high-denotative regions he saw as figures was high
(79%) in experiment 3, as it had been in experiment 2.
Once again, he tended to identify figures lying on the
left side of the central contour (86%) more accurately
than those lying on the right side of the central contour
(70%).
We do not take the finding that WG’s results differed
on first and second testing to indicate that the OMEFA
test is unreliable. The test was administered to AD
three times, and approximately equivalent results were
obtained all three times. In addition, the test has been
administered to different groups of control observers
with essentially the same results. (Compare the control
participants in this paper with those in the Peterson et
al. (1998) paper.) Instead, we take the change in WG’s
performance to indicate that his brain damage did not
permanently interfere with access to memories of object
structure. Instead, the interference evident in experi-
ment 2 was temporary.
The fact that the absence of object memory effects on
figure assignment was temporary for WG does not
diminish the importance of experiment 2. The experi-
ments in this paper are intended as a functional descrip-
tion, based on neuropsychological performance, of the
necessity and sufficiency of conscious object recognition
for object memory effects on figure assignment. We
make no claims about specific anatomical regions, given
the transient nature of WG’s deficit. Experiment 2
demonstrates that for upright displays, conscious
object recognition is not sufficient for effects of object
memories on figure assignment. It has been known for
some time that conscious object recognition is not
sufficient for object memory effects on figure assign-
ment in inverted displays (e.g. Peterson et al., 1991);
experiment 2 extended these results to upright displays.
Moreover, the results of experiment 2 limit the interpre-
tations that can be applied to the results of experiment
1.
5. General discussion
In experiment 1, the OMEFA test was administered
to the visual agnosic patient, AD. The results showed
that object memory effects on figure assignment could
be observed even when conscious object recognition is
severely impaired. Like normal observers, AD reported
seeing a larger percentage of high-denotative regions of
experimental stimuli as figures than scrambled regions
of control stimuli. Thus, conscious object recognition is
not necessary for object memory effects on figure
assignment.
Experiment 2 showed that conscious object recogni-
tion is not sufficient for object memory effects on figure
assignment. The brain-damaged participant tested in
experiment 2, WG, retained his ability to re-
cognize objects, but showed no effects of object memo-
ries on figure assignment. Unlike normal observers (and
AD), WG did not report seeing a larger percentage of
high-denotative regions of experimental stimuli as
figures than scrambled regions of control stimuli. Be-
cause conscious object recognition presumably
requires access to memories of object structure as well
as access to semantic and functional knowledge, we
supposed that WG’s brain damage slowed, but did not
eliminate, access to memories of object structure. The
slowing was sufficient to remove effects of object mem-
ories on from figure assignment, but not to impair
conscious object recognition. Indeed, when tested some
time later in experiment 3, WG did show effects of
object memories on figure assignment, suggesting that
the slowing of initial access to object memories was
temporary.
The demonstration that conscious object recognition
is neither necessary nor sufficient for object memory
effects on figure assignment rules out an argument that
the relatively larger percentage of figure reports for
high-denotative regions of experimental stimuli than for
scrambled regions of control stimuli reflects a directed
search for familiar objects. Because of her impaired
conscious object recognition, AD was unable to engage
in such a search. Nevertheless, she showed robust ef-
fects of object memories on figure assignment. On the
other hand, WG could have engaged in such a search,
given that his conscious object recognition was rela-
tively spared (and there is some evidence that he at-
tempted to in experiment 2). Nevertheless, WG failed to
show object memory effects on figure assignment. In-
deed, the results obtained in experiment 2 suggest that
a strategy of searching for familiar objects would be
unsuccessful, and therefore, could not account for the
previous results reported by Peterson and her
colleagues.
The results of experiments 1 and 2 are consistent with
a model of figure assignment recently proposed by
Peterson (1998, 1999) in which configural cues and
object recognition cues are computed in parallel in an
interacti6e shape pathway (see Fig. 9). This parallel
interactive model integrates the parallel hypothesis of
Peterson (1994a,b, 1998; Peterson & Gibson, 1993,
1994a,b) with some features of interactive hierarchical
models of figure-ground assignment (e.g. Sejnowski &
Hinton, 1987; Vecera & O’Reilly, 1998; Vecera &
O’Reilly, submitted).
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5.1. Parallel interacti6e model
In the parallel interactive model (PIM), shape pro-
cesses (i.e., processes entailing configural analysis and
access to memories of object structure) operate along
both sides of a contour simultaneously (see also Peter-
son, 1994a,b, 1999a,b)11. Shape processes operating
along the same side of a contour are interconnected via
facilitatory links, and shape processes operating along
opposite sides of a contour are interconnected, as an
ensemble, via inhibitory links (see Fig. 9).
PIM predicts that, as the strength or number of
shape cues on one side of a contour increases, inhibi-
tion sent to the shape processes operating on the other
side of the contour increases as well. If the inhibition is
sufficiently strong, it will not be possible to perceive
shape on the inhibited side of the contour. According
to PIM, the perception of shape attributes such as
symmetry versus asymmetry, convexity vs. concavity,
closure, area, familiarity versus novelty is necessary for
the perception of shape. If the processes assessing these
attributes are inhibited, shape cannot be seen. Similarly,
if these processes are inhibited, robust access to higher-
level structures necessary for conscious object recogni-
tion (i.e. include semantic and functional knowledge)
does not occur; consequently, conscious object recogni-
tion cannot occur. Therefore, the inhibited side of the
contour will be seen as a shapeless ground.
On the other hand, the shape processes operating on
the side of the contour ultimately seen as the shaped
figure are not inhibited. The facilitatory connections
between shape processes operating on the same side of
the contour can boost the activation of initially weak
shape processes. Robust access to the higher-level struc-
tures required for conscious recognition can be made by
these shape processes, and provided that brain damage
does not interfere with access to (or feedback from)
those higher-level structures, the object portrayed on
the shaped side of the contour should be recognized
consciously. Thus, without positing a separate figure-
ground stage of processing, as other models have done
(Vecera & O’Reilly, 1998; Peterson, 1999a), PIM can
account for the fact that figures appear to have a
definite shape whereas grounds appear to be shapeless.
According to PIM, it should be possible to sustain
brain damage like AD’s that interferes with conscious
recognition of objects but spares quick, early access to
memories of object structure; it is the latter process that
affects figure assignment. Such damage would most
likely affect access from shape processes to functional
and semantic knowledge (and:or feedback from this
knowledge to shape processes). It should also be possi-
ble to sustain brain damage like WG’s that interferes
with quick early access to memories of object structure
but leaves conscious object recognition relatively intact.
This is because, on the PIM model, initial deficiencies
in access to object memories may be overcome by either
feed-back from semantic and functional knowledge (if
those connections are intact) or by facilitatory connec-
tions from other shape processes operating on the same
side of the contour.
The present set of experiments also produced results
consistent with the PIM proposal that shape processing
is inhibited on regions determined to be grounds in the
course of image segregation. WG was unable to recog-
nize objects portrayed by high-denotative regions that
were not initially determined to be figures (i.e. were not
initially determined to be shaped), even when he inten-
tionally reversed the figure-ground assignment in an
attempt to find familiar objects. This finding suggests
that shape processing (including access to object memo-
ries) was inhibited on high-denotative regions that were
not initially seen as figures.
Further research is needed to assess the adequacy of
PIM as a model of figure assignment. The proposal that
access to object memories is inhibited for ground re-
gions arises uniquely from the PIM proposal that ob-
ject memories are accessed along both sides of a shared
contour in parallel with the assessment of configural
Fig. 9. The parallel interactive model (PIM). A selection of shape
processes are shown operating on both sides of a contour extracted
early in processing, including ATMOS (access to memories of object
structure); SYMM (symmetry), ENC (enclosure); and AREA. Facili-
tatory connections exits between shape processes operating on the
same side of a contour (indicated by double-headed arrows); in-
hibitory connections exits between shape processes operating on
opposite sides of a contour ( indicated by T-endings). Feed forward
and feedback connections between levels are also indicated by double
headed arrows.
11 PIM includes shape processes only; it is assumed that depth cues
are processed in a different pathway.
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cues. We are particularly intrigued by the evidence for
inhibition obtained in the present paper. Peterson
(1999b) is currently investigating whether or not inhibi-
tion of shape processes operating on ground regions
can be observed in normal observers.
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Appendix A. Object portrayed by the high-denotative
regions of the experimental stimuli
PearApple
Pine treeBell
PineappleBulb
Coffee pot Sea horse
Snow manCow
Deciduous tree Stop sign
The letter FFace profile
ToiletGuitar
UmbrellaHand
Wine glassHouse
WomanLamp
WrenchMilk can
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